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diff --git a/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..20e09c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/books/philosophy/stasis-before-the-state.md @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +[[!meta title="Stasis Before the State: Nine Theses on Agonistic Democracy"]] + +* Athor: Dimitris Vardoulakis +* References: +  * https://www.worldcat.org/title/stasis-before-the-state-nine-theses-on-agonistic-democracy/oclc/1000452218 +  * https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/2009359 +  * https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1xhr6vd +  * https://www.academia.edu/35908382/Vardoulakis_Stasis_Before_the_State_--_Introduction +  * https://www.fordhampress.com/9780823277414/stasis-before-the-state/ + +## Excerpts + +    This question would be trivial if sovereignty is under +    stood simply as the sovereignty of specific states. The +    question is pertinent when we consider the violence +    functioning as the structural principle of sovereignty. +    Sovereignty can only persist and the state that it sup +    ports can only ever reproduce its structures—political, +    economic, legal, and so on—through recourse to certain +    forms of violence. Such violence is at its most effective +    the less visible and hence the less bloody it is. This in +    sight has been developed brilliantly by thinkers such +    as Gramsci, u +     nder the rubric of hegemony; Althusser, +    through the concept of ideology; and Foucault, as the +    notion of power. It is in this context that we should also +    consider Carl Schmitt’s definition of the political as the +    identification of the e  nemy. They all agree on the essen +    tial or structural violence defining sovereignty—their +    divergent accounts of that violence notwithstanding. +    The problem of a space outside sovereignty is com + +    [...] + +    Posing the question of an outside to sovereignty +    within the context of the mechanism of exclusion turns +    the spotlight to what I call the ruse of sovereignty. This +    essentially consists in the paradox that the assertion of +    a space outside sovereignty is nothing other than the as +    sertion of an excluded space and consequently signals +    the mobilization of the logic of sovereignty. + +    [...] + +    To put this in the vocabulary used h +     ere, the at- +    tempt to exclude exclusion is itself exclusory and thus +    reproduces the logic of exclusion. + +    [...] + +    Turning to Solon’s first democratic constitution, +    I will suggest in this book that it is possible by identify +    ing the conflictual nature of democracy—or what the +    ancient Greeks called stasis. Agonistic monism holds +    that stasis is the definitional characteristic of democ +    racy and of any other possible constitutional form. Sta +    sis or conflict as the basis of all political arrangements +    then becomes another way of saying that democracy is +    the form of e  very constitution. Hence, stasis comes be- +    fore any conception of the state that relies on the ruse of +    sovereignty. + +    The obvious objection to this position would be about +    the nature of this conflict. Hobbes makes the state of +    nature — which he explicitly identifies with democracy — +    also the precondition of the commonwealth. Schmitt +    defines the political as the identification of the enemy. + +    [...] +     +    ent power. Is t  here a way out of this entangled knot? +    Antonio Negri’s most significant contribution to po +    litical philosophy is, in my opinion, precisely at this +    juncture. His intervention starts with his book on Spi +    noza, The Savage Anomaly, in which he distinguishes +    between potentia (constituent power) and potestas (con +    stituted power). 20 It is most explicitly treated in Insur- +    gencies, which provides an account of the development +    of constituent power in philosophical texts from early +    modernity onward and examines the function of con +    stituent power in significant historical events. 21 The +    starting premise of this investigation is the rejection of +    ent power. Is t  here a way out of this entangled knot? +    Antonio Negri’s most significant contribution to po +    litical philosophy is, in my opinion, precisely at this +    juncture. His intervention starts with his book on Spi +    noza, The Savage Anomaly, in which he distinguishes +    between potentia (constituent power) and potestas (con +    stituted power). 20 It is most explicitly treated in Insur- +    gencies, which provides an account of the development +    of constituent power in philosophical texts from early +    modernity onward and examines the function of con +    stituent power in significant historical events. 21 The +    starting premise of this investigation is the rejection of +    and avoiding the ruse of sovereignty. 23 +    The appeal to constituent power gives Negri the means +    to provide an account of democracy as creative activity. +    This has a wide spectrum of aspects and implications +    that I can only gesture t  oward here. For instance, this +    approach shows how democracy requires a convergence +    of the ontological, the ethical, and the political—which +    is also a position central to my own project (see Thesis +    6). Consequently, democracy is not reducible to a con +    stituted form, and thus Negri can provide a nonrepre +    sentational account of democracy. This is important +    because it enables Marx’s own distaste for representative +    democracy to resonate with contemporary sociology +    and political economy—a project that starts with Negri’s +    involvement in Italian workerism and culminates in his +    collaborations with Michael Hardt. Besides the details, +    which Negri has been developing for four decades, the +    important point is that this description of democracy +    and constituent power is consistently juxtaposed to the +    political tradition that privileges constituted power and +    sovereignty. 24 +     +    There is, however, a significant drawback in Negri’s +    approach. It concerns the lack of a consistent account of +    violence in his work. +     +    [...] +     +    Without a +    consideration of violence, radical democracy w ill never +    discover its agonistic aspect, namely, that conflict or +    stasis is the precondition of the political and that, as +    such, all political forms are effects of the democratic. In +    other words, Negri’s obfuscation of the question of vio +    lence can never lead to agonistic monism. +     +    [...] +     +Production of the real: + +    Second, the state of emergency leading to justification +    does not have to be “real”—it simply needs to be credi +    ble. Truth or falsity are not properties of power—as Fou +    cault very well recognized—and the reason for this, I +    would add, is that power’s justifications are rhetorical +    strategies and hence unconcerned with validity. This is +    the point where my account significantly diverges from +     +    [...] +     +    If we are to understand better sovereign violence, we +    need to investigate further the ways in which violence is +    justified. Sovereignty uses justification rhetorically. In +    stead of being concerned with w +     hether the justifications +    of actions are true or false, sovereignty is concerned +    with whether its justifications are believed by those it af +    fects. + +    [...] + +Torture: + +    Greek political philosophy. 4 Hannah Arendt also pays +    particular attention to this metaphor. According to Ar +    endt, Plato needs the metaphor of the politician as a +    craftsman in order to compensate for the lack of the no +    tion of authority in Greek thought. These Platonic meta +    phorics include the metaphor of the statesman as a +    physician who heals an ailing polis. 5 The metaphor of +    craftsmanship is used as a justification of political power. +    craftsmanship is used as a justification of political power. +    The metaphor persists in modernity, and we can find +    examples much closer to home. Mao Zedong justifies +    the purges of the Cultural Revolution on the following +    grounds: “Our object in exposing errors and criticizing +    shortcomings is like that of curing a disease. The entire +    purpose is to save the person.” 6 Whoever does not con +    form to the Maoist ideal is “ill” and needs to be “cured.” +    Similarly, George Papadopoulos, the colonel who headed +    the Greek junta from 1967 to 1974, repeatedly described +    Greece as an ill patient requiring an operation. The dic +    tatorial regime justified its violence by drawing an anal +    ogy of its exceptional powers to the powers of the head +    surgeon in a hospital emergency room. Th +     ese operations +    on “patients” took place not in hospitals but in dark po +    lice cells or in various forms of prisons or concentration +    camps. And the instruments of the “operations” were +    not t  hose of the surgeon but rather of the torturer and +    in many cases also of the executioner. The analogy be +    tween the surgeon and the torturer is mobilized to pro +    vide reasons for the exercise of violence. An emergency +    mobilizes rhetorical strategies that justify violence, ir +    respective of the fact that such a justification may be +    completely fabulatory. + +    -- 32-33  | 
